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ABSTRACT  
As a result of the findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Canterbury Earthquake 
Swarm of 2010-2011 the New Zealand Government has introduced new legislation that will require the mandatory 
strengthening of all earthquake-prone buildings in New Zealand.   An earthquake prone building is currently defined as 
a building that is less than one third the seismic strength of a new building.  If an owner does not wish to strengthen 
their buildings then they must demolish them. Seismic retrofitting of buildings is a form of property development and as 
such, the decision to retrofit or not should be based on a robust and soundly conducted feasibility study.  Feasibility 
studies on seismic retrofitting can be particularly challenging for a number of reasons thus making it difficult for 
owners to make informed and sound decisions relating to their earthquake prone buildings.  This paper considers the 
concept and process of feasibility analysis as applied to earthquake prone buildings and discusses the current 
challenges posed by such feasibility studies.  A number of recommendations are made in an attempt to help develop a 
best practice model for decision making relating to earthquake prone buildings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of feasibility within the context of property development and in 
particular to consider how the concept of feasibility applies to the mandatory seismic retrofitting of earthquake-prone 
buildings in New Zealand. Earthquake-prone buildings are defined as buildings that will have their ultimate capacity 
exceeded in the event of a moderate earthquake and are buildings with a seismic capacity of less than 33% of new 
building standard (NBS). 
A review of the relevant literature showed that substantial emphasis has been placed on finding technical structural 
engineering solutions to seismic retrofitting and to the analysis of existing building stock.  This engineering emphasis 
has also flowed through into policy research and analysis and macro level cost benefit analysis.  Little attention or 
research appears to have been undertaken in terms of identifying the characteristics of the building owners, the property 
market characteristic of their buildings or the motivations and decision making processes of the building owners.  While 
structural engineering is a key component of earthquake mitigation this paper asserts that it is valid and useful to 
consider seismic retrofitting as an exercise not just in structural engineering but as an exercise in property development.  
Earthquake mitigation measures such as seismic retrofitting of existing buildings are seen as a rational response to the 
risk posed by earthquakes. Evidence from past studies on hazard mitigation suggest that seismic retrofitting of 
earthquake prone buildings (EPBs) reduce loss of life and property, disaster relief costs, business interruption, and 
social and environmental losses from an earthquake disaster (Nuti and Vanzi 2003, Rose et al. 2007). However, despite 
these benefits and the growth of the technical knowledge base on earthquake risk mitigation, property owners are often 
unwilling to retrofit their EPBs (Hopkins 2005).  The unwillingness of owners of EPBs to retrofit their EPBs has been a 
critical issue in earthquake pre-disaster planning and management. Many factors such as cost, risk perception and 
efficacy of mitigation measures interact to influence seismic retrofit decisions (Egbelakin and Wilkinson 2010, Lindell 
and Prater 2000a).    
Many socio-psychologists have focused on the impact of risk perception on mitigation decisions, concluding that how 
people perceive and personalise earthquake risk significantly influences the types of protective decisions and behaviour 
adopted (Lepesteur et al. 2008, Lindell and Prater 2000b, Lindell and Prater 2002, Mulilis and Duval 1995, Tierney et 
al. 2001, Weinstein et al. 1998).  Sociologists have studied the social aspects of earthquake risk mitigation. The idea 
that risk is essentially a cultural and social construct has been strongly argued by sociologists such as Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982).  As they put it “the measurement of risk is scientific, the acceptability of risk is political”.   The 
current debate in New Zealand on seismic mitigation revolves around both the measurement of risk levels in different 
parts of the country and also the degree to which these risks should be accepted by the community. 
Some research in New Zealand (Egbelakin and Wilkinson 2010, Egbelakin et al. 2011) has tried to identify the 
impediments to the successful implementation of earthquake mitigation.  It was identified in this research that although 
the level of awareness was high amongst building owners that were surveyed there was limited appetite for carrying out 
seismic retrofitting.  High costs and low benefits of seismic retrofitting were found to be impediments.  The research 
also identified a lack of trust and belief in seismic techniques and professionals which is a problem that has been 
exacerbated by controversy and publicity over widely varying seismic assessments of the same building by different 
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engineers.  For example, it has been reported (Cantabrians Unite, 2012) that a building in Greymouth had five  separate 
evaluations carried out which resulted in assessments of 5%, 28%, 30%, 54% and 67% of new building standard (NBS).  
This particular building was a 17 year old single level retail building of comparatively modern construction which 
should have made it easier to get consistent results.   
The quality of risk information provided to owners, the communication style, and the characteristics of the agencies 
responsible for conveying this information also affect building owners’ willingness to adopt protective measures (Mileti 
and Fitzpatrick 1993, Mulilis and Lippa 1990, Pidgeon et al. 2003, Tierney et al. 2001).  
There has been some limited economic research focussing on the financial viability of valuation decisions and policies 
regarding hazardous situations, thus providing a rationale on the overall economic benefits of implementing various 
mitigation measures (Bernknopf et al. 1990, Cohen and Noll 1981, Schulze et al. 1987).   A number of studies on 
earthquake risk and property market prices found correlations between risks information and communication style, 
property values, location, government initiated policies and programs, house prices, investment decisions and owners’ 
attitudes towards implementing mitigation measures (Beck et al. 2002, Onder et al. 2004, Palm 1985, Palm 1987, Willis 
and Asgary 1997).  
In dealing with the risk relating to earthquakes there is clearly a scientific element relating to the need to study a natural 
phenomenon.  However, what is an acceptable level of risk for society is a subjective and political question.  In order to 
aid policy development and insurance underwriting a large body of literature has been produced by experts in the fields 
of engineering, insurance, and economics.  In particular a lot of effort has been put into improving the field of hazard 
assessment and various types of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).   Earthquakes are low probability but high consequence 
events.  The challenge of calculating the probability of earthquakes occurring and of then estimating their likely impact 
has received a lot of attention from both the insurance industry and earthquake engineers (Cardona et al. 2008a, 
Cardona et al. 2008b, Vanzi 2002, Bommer 2002). 
Any CBA is reliant on the gathering of accurate data and sound scientific assumptions.  This is particularly the case for 
low probability but high consequence events such as earthquakes.  A traditional CBA was applied as part of the policy 
development undertaken by the New Zealand government. This CBA (Martin Jenkins, 2012) calculated the net present 
value of mandatory strengthening as negative $1,680 million.  The benefits were assessed as reduced building damage, 
and a reduced loss of life and injury.  The analysis was done on a macro level with no attempt to split out the private 
and public components of the costs and benefits or to consider the costs and benefits on an individual building basis.   
Any attempt to carry out CBA on seismic retrofitting buildings in New Zealand is currently hamstrung by a lack of 
good data relating to existing building stock and the costs of retrofitting. There has been significant research done on 
building performance (Ingham and Griffith, 2011), and retrofitting techniques but basic information relating to 
earthquake strengthening costs is lacking in relation to New Zealand with the exception of some work done by Hare 
(Hare, 2009).  Hare analysed the costs of seismic retrofitting a sample of heritage buildings in Christchurch.  The 
general lack of cost information was highlighted in the Royal Commission and appears to contrast with the situation in 
the USA where extensive research has been done by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 1994). 
Cost benefit analysis tends to be on a macro level that considers the problem at a national, regional or city scale.  
Typically the methodology looks at the total benefits and costs with no attempt to consider to whom the benefits accrue 
or who must bear the costs of the mitigation.  While this may be useful in terms of the insurance industry and policy 
analysts it fails to address the benefit to cost ratio from a building owner perspective.  For many owners this ratio is 
negative and is a major impediment to both voluntary and mandatory seismic retrofitting as discussed by Nahkies 
(Nahkies, 2009, Nahkies, 2013).  Although this problem has been highlighted in the media, professional publications 
and submissions to the government review there remains a lack of empirically based academic research in this area.  
Research using the small provincial town of Waimate, New Zealand as a case study illustrated how empirical data could 
be gathered and also highlighted the ‘feasibility gap’ that is the major impediment to seismic retrofitting in many parts 
of New Zealand (Nahkies, 2014). 
On the 4th September 2010 the Canterbury region suffered a 7.1 magnitude earthquake which caused significant damage 
in Christchurch city but no loss of life.  Thousands of aftershocks of varying strength have occurred since but on 22nd 
February 2011 a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch causing the catastrophic collapse of many buildings and 
killing 185 people and injuring many more.  The February earthquake caused extensive damage to the Christchurch 
Central Business District (CBD) leading to the subsequent demolition of the majority of buildings in the CBD. 
 
As a result of the earthquakes and the resultant loss of life and damage, the New Zealand Government convened a 
Royal Commission of Enquiry on the 13th April 2011.  The Commission met for the first time on the 4th May 2011 and 
were required to provide a Final Report to the New Zealand Government by not later than the 12th November 2012.   
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This Final report was delivered in several parts.  Part One delivered on the 29th June 2012 consisted of 3 Volumes.  Part 
Two of the Final Report was delivered on the 10th October and consisted of Volume 4 “Earthquake-prone Buildings”.  
This volume recommended practice, policy and legislative changes to help minimise the risks to public safety from 
earthquake-prone buildings.  This report was eventually released to the public on the 7th December 2012 and identified 
and highlighted the lack of progress that had been made in New Zealand in terms of seismic retrofitting despite 
legislation promoting this process that dates from the 1950’s.  
 
The earthquakes and the Royal Commission of Enquiry also triggered an earthquake-prone building policy review by 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) which began in March 2012.  The aim of the review was 
to eventually introduce new legislation in the form of a “Building Act Amendment Bill”.   As part of this process MBIE 
released a consultation document “Building Seismic Performance” on the same day that the Royal Commission report 
was released.  The MBIE document set out proposals to improve the New Zealand earthquake -prone building system. 
 
The consultation document contained a number of proposed changes to the current legislation and compared and 
contrasted them with the recommendations contained in the Royal Commission Report.   The MBIE consultation 
document called for submissions which closed on the 8th March 2013.  As part of the consultation process a series of 
public information meetings were also held as well as additional meetings with stakeholder groups directly involved 
with implementing the earthquake-prone building system.  Although the Royal Commission recommendations were not 
binding on the government they were clearly considered as part of the review process.  
Following the MBIE review and consultation the Building (Earthquake-prone buildings) Amendment Bill was 
introduced into Parliament and passed its first reading on the 5th March 2014.  The major features of the Bill are the 
following: 
• All local authorities are required to assess buildings within 5 years 
• Owners of buildings identified as earthquake-prone are required to either strengthen or demolish their 
buildings within 15 years 
• Owners of some heritage buildings are able to apply for a 10 year extension 
• The setting up of a publicly available national register of earthquake-prone buildings 
• The delinking of fire and disabled access upgrades from seismic upgrades in certain circumstances 
• Exemptions from national timeframes for a limited number of buildings upon application 
 
Despite widespread support from virtually all of the political parties the Bill has attracted considerable debate.  Many of 
the submissions to the Local Government and Environment Select Committee considering the Bill were highly critical.  
Some of the criticism was that the Bill was too ‘soft’ and did not adequately reflect the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission.  However, the bulk of the criticism was that the Bill was too draconian and inflexible and would impose 
too high a cost on communities and individuals.  The Select Committee are due to release their report on the Bill on the 
30th March 2015 and there are expectations that there will be significant amendments to the Bill.   It is expected that the 
proposed legislation will be ‘softened’ to better achieve a balance between cost and safety. 
Regardless of the eventual outcome in relation to the legislation, the successful implementation of any seismic 
retrofitting programme will rely on creating an economic environment where the option of retrofitting is the best option 
for the property owner.  The property owner is the decision maker and unless seismic retrofitting is the most attractive 
option they may well choose to demolish their buildings or attempt to circumvent the legislation by whatever means are 
available to them.  The decision making process of the property owner and the vexed question of feasibility that 
confronts the private property owner are both important factors to consider when developing policies to encourage 
seismic retrofitting.  Automatically assuming that the majority of owners will upgrade their building to comply with the 
legislation is dangerous as clearly the owner has a number of alternative options.    
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WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE OWNER? 
 
The owner of a building forced by statute to carry out a mandatory seismic retrofit will make their decision based on 
their own particular circumstances and their analysis of their potential options.  They will attempt to analysis which of 
their various options maximises their well being. For the owners of investment property their well being is maximised 
by achieving the best financial result.  Due to the impacts of the proposed mandatory strengthening this may mean a 
case of trying to achieve the smallest loss rather than the traditional property development goal of achieving the 
maximum financial gains. The four basic options available to the owner in response to the proposed legislation are to: 
1. Do nothing (defer decision) 
2. Sell the property 
3. Demolish the building 
4. Carry out a seismic retrofit 
The costs and benefits of each of these options will need to be considered in order to arrive at a rational decision.   
 
The Do Nothing (Defer) Option 
The “Do Nothing Option” is only viable for the time periods available under the proposed legislation.  However, this 
option also raises a number of questions in terms of the robustness of any enforcement procedures proposed by the 
legislation.  There may be the potential to mount legal challenges and use delaying tactics to buy more time.   For most 
owners there is the potential to put off any seismic retrofit for at least 15 years but with the expectation that they will 
eventually be served a notice enforcing action in terms of either retrofitting or demolition.  Thus the “Do Nothing” 
option is only an interim strategy before one of the other options must be chosen.   
This option does have a number of potential advantages in that there will be time to carry out thorough investigations 
and feasibility studies.  Those feasibility studies are likely to be more accurate as there will be better cost and market 
information available based on a large number of completed projects carried out by those “early movers” quick to 
comply with the legislation.   There is also the possibility of benefitting from improved technical solutions and 
construction efficiencies due to the increased research and work in the seismic retrofit industry.  Demand for materials, 
contractors and design consultants may be less in future years than is currently the case.  Any earthquake related stigma 
may also have dissipated over time and this may improve the economics of retrofitting.  There is also a chance that the 
legislation may change over time.  Changing legislation has caught out many owners who have already carried out 
seismic retrofits under old legislation but now find themselves non-complying with the current and proposed legislation. 
There are also a number of potential disadvantages in that it may be difficult to retain tenants if the property is an 
investment property.  The costs of insurance may be high or insurance may be hard to obtain due to the unstrengthened 
nature of the building.  Potentially high holding costs associated with this option may cause financial difficulties for 
some owners.  It is also possible that banking covenants may not allow this option for some owners as they may not 
have sufficient equity or debt servicing to satisfy a lender. As a result a mortgagee sale may be triggered. 
Clearly the advantage and disadvantages would need to be weighed up but for some owners taking a “wait and see’ 
approach may be a good option as an interim measure. 
 
Sell the Property 
By selling the property the owner is able to avoid the need to become a developer.  They run the risk of achieving a low 
sale price if there is market stigma attached to their building either because of heritage controls on the building or 
perceptions relating to earthquake strengthening.  They may also achieve a high price if they can find an uninformed 
purchaser not familiar with the market or the limitations of the property.   
The outcome of the sale will likely depend on the number of competing properties on the market.  If large numbers of 
owners take this option then this may lead to an oversupply situation which will depress market values.  This is a danger 
for some provincial towns in New Zealand where the proposed legislation could trigger a recession in the commercial 
real estate markets particularly if there is little existing demand for new buildings. 
 
21st Annual PRRES Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18-21 January 2015 5 
 
 
Demolish the Building 
This is an action that may be forced on the owner in order to comply with the proposed legislation if they have done 
nothing within the currently proposed 15 year timeframe.  It may also be an action they choose to do voluntarily as it 
makes better economic sense than carrying out a seismic retrofit.  For many owners the demolition option is reliant on 
the ability to be granted a consent to demolish a heritage building.  This ability will vary from heritage building to 
heritage building depending both on the heritage status of the building and the specific planning rules that apply in the 
locality.  
In their assessment of this option the owner needs to get a clear indication of the likely costs of demolition which for 
some buildings can be substantial.  The costs of demolition will then need to be deducted off the value of the site to get 
the net redevelopment value of the land.  They must also consider their options post demolition in terms of whether they 
then intend to sell the property or alternatively whether they wish to develop some form of replacement building.   
For some properties there may be a substantial benefit to the demolition option if it allows them to unlock development 
potential lying dormant in the site.  Alternatively it may be a poor alternative where the underlying land value is low in 
comparison with the demolition costs. 
 
 
Carry Out Seismic Retrofit  
 
In order to decide how this option ‘stacks up’ the owner will typically need to carry out a feasibility study.  At a basic 
level at least the owner will need to compare the market value of their property “as is” with the market value “after 
strengthening”.  Ideally the value difference between the two valuations will exceed the costs of strengthening thus 
providing a positive economic incentive to carry out the work.  If the cost of the retrofit exceeds the value added to the 
property then the owner is losing money by carrying out the retrofit and has no economic incentive to carry out the 
work.    
 
For certain types of property and owners, non-financial factors may also be important in terms of decision making.  This 
is often the case with owner occupiers, where the value added impact of seismic retrofitting may be measured using 
different criteria to that of market value.  The impact on the value-in-use of the property may be more important than 
the value-in-exchange of the property particularly for special purpose or non-traded properties such as churches, halls, 
schools etc.  However, many earthquake-prone buildings are commercial properties owned as investments and decisions 
relating to whether to carry out seismic retrofitting will hinge around their feasibility. 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF FEASIBILITY 
In a general sense the term feasible is synonymous with words such as practicable, achievable, attainable, viable and 
realistic.  The term “feasibility” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as the “state or degree of being easily or 
conveniently done” and a “feasibility study is defined as “an assessment of the practicality of a proposed plan or 
method”. 
Seismic retrofitting is a form of property development and in reviewing the literature the most widely accepted and 
quoted definition of “feasibility’ in relation to property development was that formulated by James Graaskamp 
(Jarchow, 1991).   His definition is as follows: 
A real estate project is feasible when the real estate analyst determines that there is a reasonable likelihood of 
satisfying explicit objectives when a selected course of action is tested for fit to a context of specific constraints and 
limited resources 
Each part of the definition is important in terms of providing clarity around what is actually meant by a real estate 
project being feasible. 
The term “reasonable likelihood” provides a grounding of realism in that the expected outcome must not be fanciful or 
improbable while at the same time recognising that the ultimate completion of the project brings with it risks and no 
guarantee that the final results will match the feasibility study outcome. 
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The “satisfying explicit objectives” requires that the parameters of success are set before any conclusions regarding 
feasibility can be made.  The objectives of all “stakeholders” should be taken into account and not just those of the 
developer.  The type of building and developer will influence the likely objectives.  For example an owner- occupier 
like a Church doing a seismic retrofit may have quite different objectives to that of the owner of an investment property 
doing a seismic retrofit.  For entrepreneurial developers the major explicit objective is to make a satisfactory profit from 
the development. Clearly in all cases the public sector will also have objectives which they will promote by both 
regulatory and non-regulatory means.   
The definition also talks about a “selected course of action” which means that out of a multitude of potential options 
one must be tested and selected as being feasible.  The chosen option will ideally be the optimum that is likely to 
achieve the best result for the developer and other stakeholders.  The element of time must also be considered as the 
selected course of action must be implemented within a certain “window of opportunity”.  As a result all feasibility 
studies have a limited ‘shelf life’ before they need updating. 
The selected course of action is tested to show that it fits within the “context of specific constraints”.   These constraints 
will be physical in terms of the site and will also include legal and resource management constraints.  For seismic 
retrofits the physical characteristics of the existing building will also need to be considered as part of the site 
constraints.   
As well as specific constraints the definition also refers to “limited resources”.  This recognises that the developer must 
have access to sufficient capital, labour and knowledge to be able to carry out the development.  A project that is 
feasible for one developer may not necessarily be feasible for another developer due to the different amounts of 
resources that are available to different developers.   
There are a number of challenges to carrying out a good feasibility study for any substantial property development. 
These challenges can be even greater for many seismic retrofit projects.  This is illustrated by considering the 
application of the Graaskampf definition to seismic retrofitting. 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF FEASIBILITY APPLIED TO SEISMIC RETROFITTING 
 
Reasonable likelihood 
Forecasting financial results in the form of a feasibility study requires the making of assumptions and the estimation of 
costs and returns.  Forecasts can be improved and risk reduced where the estimates are accurate and the assumptions are 
either confirmed as correct or replaced by known variables.  As discussed in more detail later in this paper gathering 
accurate data and validating assumptions can be particularly challenging for seismic retrofits. 
 
Satisfaction of explicit objectives 
The explicit objectives for any development will be unique to the developer and the development project.  However in 
general for a seismic retrofit project there will be a clear objective relating to seismic risk reduction. The engineering 
profession in New Zealand has tried to capture or describe this risk reduction by using percentage NBS as the 
benchmark for structural strength (and thus risk).  In the case of a mandatory retrofit imposed by legislation as a 
minimum the retrofit would be expected to meet the requirements imposed by the legislation – currently proposed to be 
33.33% NBS.   In certain cases the owner may decide to exceed the standards imposed by the legislation. 
Where development is being carried out to make a profit there would be financial objectives that would need to be met 
in order for the development to be considered to be feasible.  For ‘normal’ property developments a satisfactory 
developers ‘margin’ or profit should be created to compensate the developer for their work to bring the development to 
fruition and to compensate for the risk involved in the development.  The size of this margin will vary from developer 
to developer depending on the risk they perceive for the development and the perceived effort required.  For normal 
developments the margin must be attractive enough to motivate the developer to want to undertake the development.  
For mandatory strengthening projects the owner/developer is potentially being forced to do the development but will 
still realistically factor in the effort and risk involved when considering feasibility. 
Forecasting the financial outcome of the retrofit project will often be highly challenging due to the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate costs and returns. Clearly a key component of any feasibility study is an estimate of the costs 
involved in doing the development.  Estimating the cost of a new build is generally easier than estimating the costs of 
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making changes to old buildings.  It is easier to define the scope of works relating to new buildings where as when 
working with old buildings there may be incomplete plans and specifications to allow the accurate assessment of how 
the building was constructed and how it will perform structurally.  To an extent this lack of knowledge can be overcome 
by testing, but this takes time and money. Due to the age of the building it may have deteriorated in various ways 
depending on maintenance programs and the environmental conditions acting on the building.  Such deterioration may 
not be uniform which means that even more testing is required.  Initial assumptions regarding construction and 
condition may prove wrong once testing is completed or work is begun.  Seismic retrofitting often involves partial 
deconstruction or demolition which may also show that initial assumptions are wrong.  There may also be difficulties in 
accurately estimating the time frames required to carry out the retrofit project. 
The seismic performance of buildings is also heavily influenced by ground conditions so that geotechnical investigation 
may be required or once again assumptions may need to be made in the absence of testing. 
Multiple potential design alternatives may be available with different combinations of labour and materials each with 
their own cost scenarios.  If a mandatory strengthening regime is enforced this is going to lead to considerably increased 
demands on a construction industry already stretched due to the Christchurch rebuild.  This in turn leads to inflationary 
pressures that make it more difficult for quantity surveyors to accurately estimate costs.   
A major issue with seismic retrofits is correctly defining the scope of the project. The Project Management Institutes 
document “A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge” (PMBOK Guide) describes the scoping exercise 
as developing a detailed description of the project and product.  It states that “the preparation of a detailed scope is 
critical to success and builds upon the major deliverables, assumptions and constraints that are documented during 
project initiation.”  The structural engineer often takes the lead role in designing the seismic retrofit with much of the 
emphasis regarding choice of upgrade solution based around the optimum structural design.  There is a danger that this 
focus on the structural elements of the project actually leads to a sub-optimal solution and that project costs are either 
under estimated or are higher than they need to be because too little attention is paid to the non-structural components 
of the seismic upgrade project.  Research by Riddell (2013) showed that the non-structural costs can be as significant as 
the structural costs.   Riddell carried out detailed cost analysis relating to seismic upgrades to 66.66% of NBS for three 
different buildings and came up with the following results. 
   
Building Description Structural 
Alterations 
Other Costs Total Costs Structural Costs as 
% of  Total Costs 
3 Storied URM Building of 1893m² 
built in the 1880’s 
$407 m² $1192 m² $1599 m² 25.45% 
2 Storied URM building of 727m² 
built in the 1930’s 
$433 m² $1406 m² $1839 m² 23.54% 
2 Storied URM building of 306m² 
built in 1912 
$604 m² $2172 m² $2776 m² 21.76% 
Although the analysis is based on a small number of buildings it does highlight that the structural component of the 
seismic upgrade may represent a comparatively small proportion of the total project cost.  To the cost of the structural 
alterations a number of “Other Costs” need to be considered such as the following items: 
• Persons with Disabilities Upgrade 
• Fire Upgrade 
• Services Reinstatement 
• Ancillary Works ( Demolition, reinstatement, modifications to allow structural alterations) 
• Consultants (Lead and sub consultants) 
• Tenant Costs (Rent holidays, relocation costs, legal costs) 
• Contractors Preliminary & General  
• Contingency Costs 
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As well as the challenges of accurately forecasting the scope and cost of a seismic retrofit the need to estimate the 
financial returns from the development is also likely to be difficult.  Depending on the market there may still be a 
degree of market ‘stigma’ attached to an old but strengthened building not unlike the stigma that can attach to a 
contaminated site that has been remediated.  Such ‘stigma’ can be hard to measure and can vary significantly over time 
depending on perceptions relating to earthquake risk.   The real estate market is an inefficient one where accurate 
market information may be difficult to obtain and validate.  Lack of good comparable sales or rental information may 
cause problems along with distortion in the market caused by market transactions between poorly informed vendors or 
purchasers.   
In some markets where there is a high proportion of earthquake prone buildings such as some provincial towns the 
results of mandatory seismic retrofitting may totally change the market in terms of supply and demand for property.  
For example the price of land might be reduced by a flood of redevelopment sites released to the market due to 
widespread demolition of earthquake prone buildings. 
 
Selected course of action 
In considering feasibility a selected course of action must be identified.  In practice multiple options are often tested in 
the form of a rough “back of the envelope’ feasibility analysis before more time and money is spent on the option 
identified by this screening process as being the best.  Selecting the best option in terms of seismic retrofitting can be 
difficult due to the challenge of identifying the most appropriate level of strengthening to aim for.  Instead of designing 
for the level of strength required by the legislation there may be good reasons to try and achieve a higher level of 
strengthening.  For example, it may be that the occupants of buildings do not feel safe at this level and require a higher 
level before they are willing to lease a building.  This has been the case in some markets where corporate tenants 
concerned at the need to comply with their obligations under the Health and Safety in Employment Act have been 
requiring buildings to be strengthened to at least 66% of NBS.  As a result buildings in Wellington have been 
undergoing seismic strengthening even though they are comparatively modern buildings that already exceed 33.33% of 
NBS.  An example of this is the Majestic Building.   
Going to higher levels also provides a degree of future proofing as it may allow for a “change of use” to occur in the 
building without triggering the need for additional strengthening.   Current legislation requires that a building 
undergoing a “change of use” must be brought up to “as near as reasonably practicable” to the standard of a new 
building.  This allows a degree of discretion to the Building Consent Authority in which the sacrifice or cost that must 
be met by the owner can be weighed against the public benefits accruing from the upgrade.  Where the cost is 
prohibitive a level less than 100% of NBS is often accepted as being adequate.  This is a pragmatic approach that 
recognises that it is not always feasible both from an engineering or a financial point of view to achieve 100% of NBS. 
Heritage buildings can be particularly problematic due to the desire to make the earthquake strengthening work as 
unobtrusive as possible which can increase the technical and financial challenges considerably.  There is also the irony 
that high levels of strengthening work ideally should be achieved to better safe guard the heritage building from 
potential earth quake damage.  The challenge is to do this in a way that that does not destroy the very heritage fabric 
that you are trying to protect. 
In many instances the process may well need to be an iterative one where multiple designs achieving different levels of 
structural strength are costed out and tested for fit in terms of market and heritage requirements. 
Although there are common building typologies that can and have been identified and well proven upgrade systems 
there is often a bespoke element involved in any seismic retrofit.  Different engineers may come up with different 
designs depending on their expertise and confidence.  The level of experience and expertise with analysing existing 
structures and developing appropriate upgrade solutions is highly variable across the engineering profession with the 
bulk of the education effort traditionally applied to learning about new construction and modern materials.  There is a 
danger in the current risk averse environment that over engineered solutions will be employed in retrofit projects when 
cheaper options may be sufficient. 
 
Tested within the context of specific constraints 
Identifying the specific constraints relating to seismic retrofitting requires good analysis of the site which requires 
analysis of both the soils providing support for the buildings and the buildings themselves. 
Specific constraints also take the form of land use controls imposed under the Resource Management Act.  Many 
earthquake-prone buildings also have heritage value and have various levels of protection from demolition or alteration.  
When doing retrofits they must be done in a way that reduces negative impacts on the heritage value of the building 
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which adds to the technical difficulties and costs of the retrofit.  It also may be far from clear as to whether the owner is 
allowed to pursue the option of demolition. 
It has been widely expected that the health and safety requirements of the Building Act would ‘trump’ any heritage 
protection controls imposed by the Resource Management Act.  Speculation has been that large numbers of heritage 
buildings would be demolished due to their earthquake-prone nature despite existing heritage rules protecting them. 
However, recent case law relating to the Harcourts Building in Wellington has cast some doubt regarding this. 
The Harcourts Building was completed in 1928 for T&G, an Australian insurer.  It comprises 7 storeys of office 
accommodation and a small rooftop flat.  The ground floor is occupied by retail premises. It was listed for protection in 
the Wellington District Plan in 1994 and is a Category I listed building under The Heritage NZ Act. 
 
In June 2011 Mark Dunajschik, the owner of the building was quoted in the Dominion Post as saying the Harcourts 
Building had lost nearly half its value since the Christchurch quakes.  He said it was previously valued at between $20m 
and $22m but was now worth only about $12m.  He signalled his intention to demolish and build a 25 storey office 
building on the site. 
 
The building had been assessed by the Wellington City Council as meeting only 17% of the new building standard and 
thus was deemed to be an “earth-quake prone building.”   As a result the Council issued a section 124 notice on the 27th 
July 2012 to the owners requiring them to either strengthen the building or demolish it within 20 years. 
Dunajschik applied for a resource consent to allow demolition and the Wellington City Council Planners recommended 
the consent for demolition be granted due to the risk posed to public safety. The hearing was held in December 2012 
and the resource consent was declined.  
 
This decision was appealed to the Environment Court who upheld the original decision. Dunajtschik then appealed 
against the Environment Court decision in the High Court.  The High Court found in his favour and the case was sent 
back to the Environment Court.  The Environment Court re-heard the case but came to the same decision as previously 
which is to not to allow demolition to take place due to the loss of heritage value that will occur. 
 
The situation with the Harcourts Building is an interesting one as it highlights the dilemma faced by many building 
owners with earthquake-prone buildings.  Comprehensive feasibility studies were prepared at substantial cost that 
reached the conclusion that due to the high costs of earthquake strengthening (estimated at $10.85 million) the property 
in an “as is” state is worth nothing.  If the buildings were able to be demolished it is estimated to be worth $3.17 million 
as a redevelopment site, however that is no longer a feasible option. 
The Harcourts Building also highlights the unresolved tension between the Resource Management Act which seeks to 
protect heritage and the Building Act which seeks to promote a safe built environment.  It shows that the option to 
demolish may not always be available to an owner and this will need to be an important consideration in any feasibility 
study. 
 
Limited Resources 
Feasibility is not a hypothetical situation but one that must be achievable or practicable for a particular developer.  In 
the case of a ‘normal’ development the role of the developer is a voluntary one and the feasibility analysis process is 
carried out so that the developer does not undertake a development beyond their resources.  In the case of mandatory 
seismic retrofits the role of developer is forced on the owner regardless of their resources and thus the retrofit may not 
be feasible for the owner.  The legislation has the impact of creating a large number of accidental developers who may 
be ill equipped or resourced to undertake developments.   Resources required to undertake developments are capital and 
knowledge – both of which may be hard to acquire for the owner.  These accidental developers may have little 
understanding of the development process or know what is required to carry out a feasibility analysis. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lack of progress in retrofitting earthquake-prone buildings that was exposed by the Christchurch earthquakes and 
highlighted by the Royal Commission is a result of market forces and poor feasibility.  The imposition of stronger 
regulation is unlikely to solve this problem.  However, the potential delinking of disabled persons and fire upgrades will 
improve the feasibility for many buildings.  
Unless the feasibility equation is improved the result of stronger regulation is likely to lead to widespread demolition of 
buildings rather than seismic retrofitting.  This is an outcome that has not been considered in any cost benefit studies or 
adequately acknowledged by policy makers. 
There are a number of non-regulatory approaches that could enhance feasibility such as tax relief, financial grants, and 
free advice that need to be considered.   The use of non-regulatory approaches has the benefit of allowing a recognition 
of the mix of public and private benefits and costs that are applicable to seismic retrofitting. 
Policy development has been clearly handicapped by a lack of information relating to the number and type of buildings 
that are earthquake prone, the likely costs and value impacts of seismic retrofitting and the characteristics and resources 
of the owners of earthquake-prone buildings. 
As well as handicapping policy development the lack of accurate cost information is a serious issue for owners carrying 
out feasibility studies in order to make sound decisions.  Unless the scope and cost of the retrofits can be accurately 
assessed the value of any feasibility study as a decision making tool will be severely compromised.  There is some 
evidence that both scope and cost are currently being underestimated with too little attention being paid to the non- 
structural cost items associated with retrofits.  
Seismic retrofits can often be complex and challenging development projects requiring extensive development 
expertise.  Many owners of earthquake prone buildings lack this expertise and are unlikely to understand the 
development process. 
There is current uncertainty as to the degree to which heritage protection legislation ‘trumps’ earthquake prone building 
regulation which therefore can introduce uncertainty into the feasibility analysis process. 
The feasibility of retrofitting could be considerably improved by allowing staged development where the main driver of 
the retrofit is regulation and not the market.  This may take the form of allowing a securing process similar to the “bolts 
and braces” approach used to strengthen URM buildings in San Francisco.  The next stage is to bring the building up to 
a higher level based on the “sweet spot” of the building as discussed by Ferner et al (2014) as being a level of 
strengthening that utilises existing building elements as much as possible.  A third stage could eventually be undertaken 
to strengthen the building up to some suitable “aspirational” level. 
Both the current and proposed legislation place too much emphasis on achieving an often arbitrary and contentious 
percentage of NBS.  Increased focus should be placed on the identification and remediation of major risk elements in 
the building.  Such an approach would be complimentary to the staged development approach. 
Feasibility could be improved by flexible time frames.  This flexibility could be based around negotiations in terms of 
proposed risk reduction and staged development.   For example early implementation of Stage One could ‘buy’ you 
more time to do Stage 2.  Such an approach would achieve the greatest gains in risk reduction over the shortest time.  
Where there are good reasons to either speed up or slow down the process these should be negotiated and ‘locked in’ 
with the owner.  For example this might revolve around planned maintenance and/or changes in tenancy.   
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Identify and consider all options 
All four options of defer, sell, demolish, or retrofit should be considered by the owner.  This will require a number of 
consultants including a valuer in order to obtain market information that will be key to assessing the various options for 
the owner.  Within the retrofit option there will be a number of options to consider with a key decision to be made 
regarding what level of seismic upgrade to implement and the extent of additional non seismic upgrades to be included. 
 
Allow Adequate Time and Money  
The feasibility study may be challenging and potentially require substantial time and money which the owner will need 
to budget for.  Considerable time may also be required in terms of completing the feasibility study.  For example 
completing engineering assessments of the building and site may be a lengthy process.  
 
Ensure full scope of works is considered and costs 
Care must be given to ensuring that a full “scope of works” is developed when analysing costs and that due 
consideration is given to the non-structural component of the project.  Care must be taken that costs are not missed out 
or alternatively double counted. 
 
Use a multidisciplinary design team early in the process 
In projects where the non-structural costs are significant a range of design expertise should be employed early in the 
design concept stage and the lead designer should not necessarily be the structural engineer.  For example with 
buildings of high heritage value a conservation architect should be used early in the process to help guide structural 
designs.  The cheapest structural solution may not always be the optimum design as any potential structural savings may 
be ‘swamped’ by increased costs of a non-structural type.  Advice from contractors and valuers may also be valuable at 
the preliminary design stage. 
 
Use an appropriate project delivery option 
In considering project delivery options the owner should consider other options to the traditional tender process.  Other 
options such as design-build or negotiated contract should be considered as they may reduce the time and costs 
involved. 
 
Consider timing and staging of development 
If the initial feasibility of retrofitting appears poor then the owner should consider the option of staging the retrofitting 
and/or deferring it until market conditions or other circumstances become more favourable.    
 
 
21st Annual PRRES Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18-21 January 2015 12 
 
 
REFERENCES 
The Building Act 2004. 
The Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013. 
The Resource Management Act 1991. 
 
Beck, J., Porter, K., Shaikhutdinov, R., Au, S., Mizukoshi, K., Miyamura, M., Ishida, H., Moroi, T., Tsukada, Y. & 
Masuda, M. 2002. Impact of seismic risk on lifetime property values. California Institute of Technology. 
Bernknopf, R., Brookshire, D. & Thayer, M. 1990. Earthquake and volcano hazard notices: An economic evaluation of 
changes in risk perceptions, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 18 (issue), 35-49. 
Bommer, J.J.,2002. Deterministic  Vs . Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment: An Exaggerated and Obstructive 
Dichotomy, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 6:S1, 43-73. 
Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission (2012) Final Report Volume 4 December 2012 
Cantabrians Unite (2012). www.facebook.com/Cantabrians Unite: downloaded 10/12/2012 
Cardona. O., Ordaz.M.,Yamin.L.,Marulanda.M.,Barbet.C., 2008a, Earthquake Loss Assessment for Intergrated Disaster 
Risk Management, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 12:S2, 48-59. 
Cardona. O., Ordaz.M.,Marulanda.M.,Barbet.C., 2008b, Estimation of Probabilistic Seismic Losses and the Public 
Economic Resilience - An Approach for a Macroeconomic Impact Evaluation, Journal of Earthquake 
Engineering, 12:S2, 60-70. 
Cohen, L. & Noll, R. 1981. The Economics of Building Codes to Resist Seismic Shocks Public Policy, Winter (issue), 
1-29. 
Cousins W.J (2013) Potential Benefits of Strengthening Earthquake-prone Buildings. Conference Paper Presented at the 
New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers Conference, Wellington April 26th-28th 2013. 
Douglas. M. & Wildavsky. A. 1982.  Risk and Culture, University of California Press, Berkley 1982.  
Egbelakin, T. & Wilkinson, S. 2010. Sociological and Behavioural Impediments to Earthquake Hazard Mitigation, 
International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment 1(issue), 310-321. 
Egbelakin,T.,Wilkinson, S.,Potangaroa, R.,Ingham,J.2011. Enhancing seismic risk mitigation decisions: amotivational 
approach. Construction Management and Economics 29:10,1003-1016. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 1994. Typical Costs for Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings: Vol I,  
FEMA156/1994, Second Edition. 
Ferner H, Beer A and Spencer M. (2014) Heritage Buildings – Seismic Risk Management, A Structural Engineers 
Perspective.  Conference Paper presented at the 4th Australasian Engineering Heritage Conference, Lincoln University, 
Canterbury, 24th-26th November 2014. 
Hare. J. 2009. Consultancy Report Prepared for Christchurch City Council. 
Hopkins, D. 2005. The value of earthquake engineering, SESOC Journal, 13 (issue), 40-42. 
Ingham, J & Griffith M.C 2011. The Performance of Unreinforced Masonry Buildings in the 2010/2011 Canterbury 
Earthquake Swarm.  Report to the Royal Commission, August 2011. 
Jarchow S.P ed 1991 Graaskamp on Real Estate, Urban Land Institute, Washington, D. C., 1991 
Lepesteur, M., Wegner, A., Moore, S. A. & McComb, A. 2008. Importance of public information and perception for 
managing recreational activities in the Peel-Harvey estuary, Western Australia, Journal of Environmental 
Management, 87 (issue), 389-395. 
Lindell, M. K., Alesch, D., Bolton, P. A., Greene, M. R., Larson, L. A., Lopes, R. May, P.J., M., J.P., N., S., , Nigg, J. 
M., Palm, R., Pate, P., Perry, R. W., Pine, J., Tubbesing, S. K. & Whitney, D. J. 1997. Adoption and 
implementation of hazard adjustments, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 15 (issue), 
327- 453. 
Lindell, K. M. & Prater, C. S. 2000a. Household Adoption of Seismic Hazard Adjustments: A Comparison of Residents 
21st Annual PRRES Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18-21 January 2015 13 
 
 
in Two States, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 18 (issue), 317-338. 
Lindell, M. K. & Prater, C. S. 2000b. Household adoption of seismic hazard adjustments: A comparison of residents in 
two states, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 18 (issue), 317 – 338. 
Lindell, M. K. & Prater, C. S. 2002. Risk Area Residents' Perceptions and Adoption of Seismic Hazard Adjustments, 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32 (issue), 2377-2392. 
Martin Jenkins Consultants 2012.  Indicative CBA Model for Earthquake Prone Building Review.  Summary of 
methodology and results, Final Report - September 2012. 
Mileti, D. S. & Fitzpatrick, C. 1993. The great earthquake experiment: Risk communication and public action, 
Westview, Boulder, CO. 
Mulilis, J.-P. & Duval, T. S. 1995. Negative Threat Appeals and Earthquake Preparedness: A Person-Relative-to-Event 
(PrE) Model of Coping With Threat, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25 (issue), 1319-1339. 
Mulilis, J. & Lippa, R. 1990. Behavioral change in earthquake preparedness due to negative threat appeals: A test of 
protection motivation theory, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20 (issue), 619-638. 
Nahkies, P.B 2009. Seismic Upgrading – Meeting the Economic Challenge: In:  Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 
Conference; Sydney, Australia, 18-21 January 2009 
Nahkies P.B. 2013. The Canterbury Royal Commission - Impacts on the Property Market: In: Pacific Rim Real Estate 
Society Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 13th-16th January 2013. 
Nahkies P.B. 2014. Mandatory Seismic Retrofitting - A Case Study of the Land Use Impacts on a Small Provincial 
Town: In: Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, Christchurch, New Zealand, 19th-22nd  January 2014. 
Nuti, C. & Vanzi, I. 2003. To retrofit or not to retrofit?, Engineering Structures, 25 (issue), 701-711. 
Onder, Z., Dokmeci, V. & Keskin, B. 2004. The Impact of Public Perception of Earthquake Risk on Istanbul's Housing 
Market, Journal of Real Estate Literature, 12 (issue), 181-196. 
Palm, R. 1985. Home mortgage lenders and earthquake hazards, Papers in Regional Science, 57 (issue), 139-153. 
Palm, R. 1987. Pre-disaster Planning: the response of residential real esate developers to special study zones 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 5 (issue), 95-102. 
Pidgeon, N. F., Kasperson, R. E. & Slovic, P. 2003. The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Riddell M.T. (2013) Assisting Owners to Make Informed Decisions Regarding Seismic Retrofitting of Unreinforced 
Masonry Buildings. A dissertation submitted for the Degree of Master of Property Studies at Lincoln University 2013.  
Rose, A., Porter, K., Dash, N., Bouabid, J., Huyck, C., Whitehead, J., Shaw, D., Eguchi, R., Taylor, C., McLane, T., 
Tobin, L. T., Ganderton, P. T., Godschalk, D., Kiremidjian, A. S., Tierney, K. & West, C. T. 2007. Benefit-
Cost Analysis of FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants, Natural Hazards Review, 8 (issue), 97-111. 
Schulze, W., Brookshire, D., Hageman, R. & Tschirhart, J. 1987. Benefits and costs of earthquake resistant buildings, 
Southern Economic Journal, 53 (issue), 934-951. 
Taig T. (2012) A Risk Framework for Earthquake Prone Building Policy TTAC Limited and GNS Science 2012 
Tierney, K. 2008. Effective Strategies for Hazard Assessment and Loss Reduction: The Importance of Multidisciplinary 
and Interdisciplinary Approaches (Internet Report). Boulder: Natural Hazards Research and Applications 
Information Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA. 
Tierney, K. J., Lindell, M. K. & Perry, R. W. 2001. Facing the Unexpected : Disaster Preparedness and Response in 
the United States, Washington, DC, USA, Joseph Henry Press. 
Vanzi, I 2002. When Should Seismic Retrofitting of Existing Structures be Implemented in Order to Minimise Expected 
Losses, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 6:1 53-73. 
Weinstein, N. D., Rothman, A. J. & Sutton, S. R. 1998. Stage theories of health behavior: Conceptual and 
methodological issues, Health Psychology, 17 (issue), 290-299. 
Willis, K. & Asgary, A. 1997. The Impact of Earthquake Risk on Housing Markets: Evidence from Tehran Real Estate 
Agents, Journal of Housing Research, 8 (issue), 125-136. 
